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Abstract  
Morgan has argued that attitudes to the medicalisation of sports are historically conditioned. 
While the history of doping offers contested versions of when the sports world turned against 
conservative forces, Morgan has argued that these attitudes are out of step with prevailing 
norms and that the World Anti Doping Agency’s policy needs to be modified to better reflect 
this. As an advocate of critical democracies in sports, he argues that anti-doping policy must 
acknowledge and reflect these shifts in order to secure their legitimacy. In response, we criti-
cally present the World Anti-Doping Agency’s policy that incorporates the Prohibited List of 
Substances and Methods for athletes. We evaluate the validity of the therapy-enhancement 
distinction in relation to its role in both justifying and sustaining the operation of the Prohib-
ited List. In particular, we focus on the case of thyroxine, which has been the subject of con-
troversy in athletic doping. While thyroxine is not currently banned, critics have claimed that 
its use in the absence of a relevant pathology is tantamount to doping. We challenge Mor-
gan’s claim that a conventionalist defence of the therapy-enhancement distinction is the best 
available, and his conclusion that this properly supports a more permissive stance towards 
performance-enhancing drug use. Furthermore, we reject his conventionalist support for dem-
ocratic line drawing in relation to doping and in particular the status of thyroxine with regard 
to the prohibited list. We offer a modified defence of the status quo, a qualified, naturalist ac-
count of health and disease, where athletes may be prescribed drugs that are genuine re-
sponses to medical necessity that do not, or do not typically, threaten the goods of athletic ex-
cellence.  
Introduction 
Among his extensive and critical oeuvre in the philosophy of sport, Morgan (2009) has ar-
gued that our attitudes and values in relation to the medicalisation of sports is a historically 
conditioned affair. Hoberman (2001; 2007) and others have drawn attention to what has often 
been an unholy alliance of forces where athletes have been either pawns in a political game 
or willing pharmacological adventurers in seeking athletic and related commercial goals. The 
history of doping offers contested versions of when the world turned against conservative 
forces (Dimeo, 2008; Houlihan, 2002; Møller, 2009) but Morgan has argued that these atti-
tudes are now, so out of step with prevailing social norms regarding enhancement that the 
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rules regarding them need to be modified.  As a powerful voice in support of critical democ-
racies in sports, he argues that anti-doping policy must reflect such shifts to retain their legiti-
macy. In this essay we critically present the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) policy 
that incorporates the Prohibited List of Substances and Methods for athletes and discuss 
whether the therapy-enhancement distinction can justify and sustain its operation. We do so 
against Morgan’s claims that a conventionalist defence of the distinction, the best available, 
supports a more permissive stance towards performance enhancing drug use. We challenge 
his conventionalist support for democratic line drawing in relation to doping. In contrast we 
present a modified defence of the status quo, which we take to be a naturalist account of 
health and disease, where athletes may be prescribed performance enhancing substances that 
are genuine responses to medical necessity that do not, or do not typically, threaten the goods 
of athletic excellence and thus the integrity of sporting competition. 
WADA, Morgan, and the therapy-enhancement distinction. 
In 1999 the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established as part of a drive to har-
monise anti-doping policy (WADA, 2018a), funded by both international sports federations 
and governments. Its policy tool is the World Anti-Doping Code, the most recent version of 
which was published in 2015 (WADA, 2015). Within the code WADA refer to its Prohibited 
List (PL), published as a separate document (WADA, 2018b) and updated annually. The PL 
designates those substances and methods that are banned either in competition, out of compe-
tition, or both. A number of substances or methods have provoked controversy, either be-
cause of their inclusion or exclusion from the PL. For example, the use of platelet rich plasma 
therapy as a technique to enhance recovery was previously prohibited but is now permitted 
(WADA, 2011). Caffeine, currently being monitored by WADA for potential patterns of 
abuse, is not on the PL, yet there is evidence to suggest that it has enhancing effects, and that 
certain levels of use might be detrimental to health (Momaya et al., 2015).  
The WADA Code (2015) offers a rationale for candidates that may be placed on the PL of 
substances and methods. At least two of the following three criteria must be met: (1) The sub-
stance or method under consideration must enhance performance or have the potential to do 
so; (2) it must be harmful for health, or have the potential to be so; and (3) it must be detri-
mental to the Spirit of Sport. These criteria and the PL can be considered the principle anti-
doping policy tool, modifying the ways in which athletes train and perform for and in athletic 
competition. An anti-doping rule violation cannot be contested on the grounds of WADA’s 
interpretation of such criteria, for example claiming that the use of a particular substance or 
method is not contrary to the spirit of sport, or that it does not enhance performance.  Consid-
erable debate has been had as to whether the spirit of sport criterion ought to be utilised in 
this policy (Kornbeck, 2013; Loland and Hoppeler, 2012; McNamee, 2012; McNamee, 
2014). 
Morgan (2009) discusses the PL and the moral permissibility of certain methods of perfor-
mance enhancement. In a paper concerned with the distinction between treatment and en-
hancement and the nature of the athletic ideal Morgan makes several related, though not 
wholly converging, claims, that are the subject of our critical concern. His view has some res-
onance with (though we do not claim it is indebted to) the view that ageing is a disease to be 
combatted by medicine.(Bulterijs et al., , 2015). In his writing the more contentious language 
of enhancement is elided with the less contentious one of health-maintenance. 
We are sympathetic to Morgan’s goal: to mark a distinction that grants normative leverage to 
prohibit/permit some substances and methods while not allowing a pharmacological free for 
all.  He argues, in two ways, that this his position is a fusion of medical and sporting criteria: 
First, he says that we should permit certain banned substances at prescribed levels. Morgan 
advocates removing amphetamines and anabolic steroids from the PL, while simultaneously 
retaining the presence of Beta Blockers on the PL. Morgan’s reasons for this challenging shift 
in anti-doping policy are as follows. The public view on matters of enhancement, athletic ex-
cellence and treatment differ to that reflected in anti-doping policy. Close attention to this 
“historically informed and publicly backed” (2009:166) understanding of athletic excellence 
would inform a view of steroids and amphetamines as treatments, that, “in the amounts pres-
ently ingested belong in the treatment rather than the enhancement category” (2009: 165-6). 
This conventionalist approach to the treatment enhancement distinction claims, that we can 
neither define nor operationalise such concepts independent of an historically situated public 
view. He specifically rejects notions of treatment grounded in ahistorical conceptions of both 
health and normality (Morgan, 2009). Secondly, and relatedly, he argues that some sub-
stances or methods are contrary to the precise nature of the contest itself.  Thus, Beta Block-
ers may help diminish psychological factors that impede performance (such as anxiety and 
choking) that elite athletes ought to master in order to achieve excellent sporting perfor-
mance, and thus are a corruption of athletic excellence within the activity. We disagree with 
Morgan’s more permissive stance with regard to WADA’s PL. We accept the difficulties in 
founding the treatment enhancement distinction on contested conceptions of health and nor-
mality. We advocate, however, for the pragmatic use of a naturalist conception of health to 
inform the PL. This pragmatic approach, we argue, better supports a defensible notion of the 
spirit of sport, that is attentive to means by which excellent performance is attained. We ar-
gue that Morgan’s own view of sporting excellence is overly focused on outcome, neglecting 
the means to this excellence that we consider so important. 
In order to challenge Morgan’s views we explore the contested issue of thyroxine and its ab-
sence on WADA’s PL. We first explore whether a clear distinction might be made between 
use of thyroxine and related drugs for therapeutic purposes and its (non-legitimate use) for 
enhancement or non-treatment purposes, that could be incorporated in anti-doping policy. 
Secondly, we consider whether its justification ought to rest on nothing more than a conven-
tion as Morgan suggests. This at least offers a starting point from which to consider whether 
to prohibit the substance thyroxine as an attempt to restrict use solely to legitimated therapeu-
tic processes (ie subsequent to the granting of a therapeutic use exemption by a suitably qual-
ified medical authority). Or whether the difficulty to define exactly what is meant by a legiti-
mate therapeutic use means that thyroxine’s omission from the PL is justified. The controver-
sial case of thyroxine and its status with respect to the PL offers an opportunity to critically 
explore Morgan’s approach to distinguishing between treatment and enhancement in anti-
doping policy.  
Thyroxine use and misuse in sports 
The use of the hormone replacement drug thyroxine in a sporting context has been the topic 
of recent debate. UK multiple medal winning middle distance athlete Jo Pavey objected to its 
‘unethical use’ in mid-2015. (The Guardian, 2015). Pavey’s argument appeared to be limited 
to the use of thyroxine as a perceived performance enhancer, rather than its therapeutic use. 
Recent interviews with medical professionals in the United Kingdom suggested that athletes 
using such a substance thought it left them a bit ‘zippier’ (McNamee et al., 2017). Thyroxine 
itself is used in a medical capacity as a treatment for deficient operation of thyroid glands. 
Thyroxine appears to be a drug that is misused with some frequency in the bodybuilding 
community. A cursory survey of bodybuilding websites and forums suggests that the drug is 
being used for weight loss (Subsinsky, 2017). The use of the drug for such purposes was one 
of many charges levelled at  the renowned American track coach, and former world class ath-
lete, Alberto Salazar in a UK Panorama documentary exploring doping in elite running. Yet 
the use of thyroxine is not something that breaches WADA’s rules, though its use for non-
medical purposes raises a number of ethical questions. Critically, however, establishing pre-
cisely what constitutes non-medical purposes is a notoriously difficult task.  
There is reported disagreement on the status of thyroxine between anti-doping organisations, 
with UK-Anti-Doping and The US Anti-Doping agency having reportedly supported the in-
clusion of thyroxine on WADA’s list of prohibited substances and methods (Butler, 2016). 
WADA has to date resisted this addition appearing unconvinced of its enhancing properties 
(ibid). Thus an interesting problem remains. Anti-Doping agencies appear to disagree over 
whether a substance meets the criteria for being placed upon the PL. Currently thyroxine is 
not prohibited, yet some evidence from expert sports medicine interviews and surveys with 
elite UK sports physicians (McNamee et al., 2017) suggests that it is perceived as a problem-
atic means of performance enhancement.  
The problem does not just concern the effects of the medication scientifically understood, and 
the potentially enhancing nature of the drug. One suggestion is that sports physicians might 
interpret thyroid function tests so that merely fatigued athletes can be prescribed thyroxine. 
Drawing a line between the fatigue naturally caused by serious athletic training and some 
more sustained pathological condition is challenging to say the least. Moreover, the contro-
versy over the prescription of thyroxine here concerns when it is justified to use medical 
means to respond to what might simply be a perceived problem. And when it might not be. Is 
seeking medical means in this case a legitimate therapeutic measure? Whether and how we 
might justify a distinction between treatment and enhancement, or indeed treatment and non-
treatment is the topic of Morgan’s (2009) paper and goes to the heart of the issue of whether 
thyroxine ought to be prohibited. What if any decision procedure is enabled by the conven-
tionalist stance? Responses to these questions require consideration of the nature of disease 
and illness which seems to underpin ideas of medical conceptions of normal health. 
Thyroxine and therapy  
It is of course feasible that an athlete might be prescribed thyroxine for therapeutic purposes 
for a thyroid deficiency. Therapy here might be understood as a restoration or compensation 
for loss of function. On this understanding for an intervention to considered as therapeutic it 
must respond to a pathology of some kind. An approach informed by Christopher Boorse’s 
celebrated theory of health might claim that a disease, or indeed a sporting injury marks a de-
viation from species typical functioning (Boorse, 1975; 1977). His account offers an appar-
ently simple decision procedure to draw a line for the distinction.  According to Boorse, such 
deviations can be determined bio-statistically, and therefore do not rely on the report of indi-
viduals, intertwined as they may be with subjective perceptions of lowered function.   
Suppose that a sports physician monitors an athlete via a thyroid function test. She deter-
mines that the athlete who presents themselves as chronically fatigued does not in itself pre-
sent with a genuine pathology, which merits a medical response. Perhaps they have a tradi-
tional conception of medicine wherein it is only legitimate to use medical means in response 
to an underlying pathology or disease, that can be ascertained scientifically (statistically), in-
dependent of value judgements, or subjective reports of, for example, tiredness?  
Within the philosophy of medicine, Boorse’s (1977) theory of disease and indeed health sus-
tains the position of our conservative physician, though it has been the subject to many chal-
lenges (and indeed responses2). This notion of disease, and enhancement as a deviation from 
a norm, is referred to in WADA’s policy (see e.g. WADA’s International Standard for Thera-
peutic Use Exemptions, 2016). Within the philosophy of sport, Morgan rejects such non-nor-
mative leverage for developing  normative pictures of sports and doping regulations. If true, 
or at least if useful, it could provide a strong basis from which to defend anti-doping policy.  
Boorse’s earlier work defines health with the use of the following:  
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional design; 
specifically, an age group of a sex of a species. 
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference class is a 
statistically typical contribution by it to their individual survival and reproduction. 
3. Health in a member of the reference class is normal functional ability: the readi-
ness of each internal part to perform all its normal functions on typical occasions 
with at least typical efficiency. 
4. A disease is a type of internal state which impairs health, i.e. reduces one or more 
functional abilities below typical efficiency.(Boorse, 1977: 555) 
For our athletes being prescribed with thyroxine the legitimacy of this intervention hinges on 
how a ‘reference class’ (i.e. a group of individuals) respond to heavy training loads. If the 
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typical or normal response reflected in the tests (sub-normal thyroid function tests) was evi-
dent throughout the reference class the reported tiredness of the athletes can be seen as nor-
mal effects of training. The athlete in our example is responding to heavy training in a species 
typical fashion, tiredness is not a threat to survival or reproduction and therefore medical 
means are not legitimate. We might build upon the conception of health defended above, to 
say that morally legitimate use of resources, or indeed the practice of (sports) medicine, 
should be understood as a response to a deviation from species typical functioning that threat-
ens the individual in some way. 
Is this approach to the identification of normal functioning conclusive? The approach relies 
upon being able to scientifically describe what constitutes a disease, which will determine 
what constitutes a therapy. But this appears to run into problems once we try to draw conclu-
sions from the responses of the references class. First, we have to consider what the appropri-
ate reference class would be. Let us assume that the reference class must be composed of elite 
athletes rather than a population-wide sample. Then we can see how levels of functioning 
might deviate and indeed drop below the norm in similar athlete patients. Then we are pre-
sented with the difficult task of deciding what sample would be similar and large enough to 
draw valid conclusions. It is unlikely that this selection of the reference class would be an en-
terprise completely devoid of value judgements, and since the power of Boorse’s theory rests 
on a biostatistical, not normative, basis this seems to weaken the position (Kingma, 2017). 
Secondly, some interpretative methodology will be necessary in order to statistically analyse 
data (Cooper and Nevill, 2005). If everyone in the reference class shows similar decrease in 
thyroid function then we may conclude that this is a problem of living (more specifically of 
intense athletic training) rather than a specifically medical one. What if a proportion of the 
reference class, however, do not respond to training in this fashion? At what stage (or with 
reference to what levels of statistical significance) should we conclude that the response of 
our hypothetical athlete is an abnormal one, requiring medical intervention? At some stage it 
seems that these decisions require some sort of value judgement as to what constitutes a sig-
nificant finding, and one of the stated advantages of such an account is that it seeks to avoid 
such value judgements.  
   
There are further challenges to conceptions of health derived from scientifically ascertained 
measures of species typical functioning. One important observation is that normal responses 
need not always rule out a medical problem. That the reference class would all respond to the 
heavy training load in this way need not suggest that at root there is not a health problem, but 
rather that sport participated in at this level causes certain health problems which is reasona-
ble to respond to via medical means. Thinking along these lines might help shift us away 
from a conception of health and therapy based upon bio-statistically derived normality and its 
restoration and toward a conception of the therapy-enhancement distinction that takes note of 
the sporting environment and its attendant stresses and strains.  
It seems that trying to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate thyroxine use, with 
appeal to Boorse’s conceptions of health and disease, appears problematic. Value judgements 
are likely to be needed at a number of stages. This of course raises the question, which or 
whose values are best used to define such concepts. Morgan’s (2009) conventionalist stance 
addresses this very issue. On Boorse’s account outlined above notions of disease and health 
exist in nature. The proper understanding and use of the term disease does not deviate from 
culture to culture, or according to history, but requires identifying a deviation from a non-
normative species typical norm. Morgan offers a conventionalist view of the treatment-en-
hancement distinction. His account explores (some) conventions that surround such distinc-
tions and how they might change as our attitudes change toward sports and the use of medi-
cations. Morgan (2009) points out that sport itself can be argued to be an unhealthy pastime, 
indeed we might say that the ethos of elite sport and anti-doping policy ought not primarily 
be concerned with potential harms to health. He argues, on descriptive or empirical grounds, 
that elite sports are contexts in which the use of medical means in order to better compete is 
commonplace. This appears permissive to the extent that he has no normative leverage to 
prohibit substance misuse, such as the widespread over consumption of anti-inflammatories, 
in many team sports. He writes:  
When drugs are enlisted in our effort to cope not just with the rigour and stress of 
everyday life, but further with the rigour and stress of performing music, or churning 
out new intellectual ideas and products, or pursuing athletic dreams, it suggests that 
what we are doing in all these cases is more so treatment than enhancement. In other 
words, part of the reason why substances like steroids are no longer considered mor-
ally toxic to everyday living, or music-making, or athletic pursuits, is that they now 
seem to be beneficial ways to sustain our performance in these disparate endeavours, 
that is, as treatments, rather than as ways to raise the level of the already impres-
sively high standards that are regularly achieved in these endeavours, that is, as en-
hancements. 
  (Morgan, 2009:  170). 
Modern elite sport, Morgan argues, has arrived at a point where it is reasonable to consider 
(some) steroid use in order to recover from hard training sessions as a treatment rather than 
enhancement. Being conventionalist Morgan’s account does not appeal to scientific concep-
tions of normality, or indeed any other conception of normal function in order to distinguish 
between therapy (restoring function) and enhancement of capabilities beyond normal func-
tion. For Morgan the key question is not whether thyroxine is a therapy or not, but whether it 
is perceived by a relevant sporting public to be consistent with the kinds of tests that sport of-
fers, or whether it is in some way a threat to the integrity of the competition itself.  
With respect to the characterisation of medical means, Morgan explores some empirical evi-
dence to suggest that a modern Western notion of treatment has rejected the Boorsian con-
ception. Those activities - like the use of medications such as steroids or possibly thyroxine 
in order to prepare for, and perform in, athletic contests - are ethically defensible against a 
broader conception of living well. It is important to note that Morgan’s account is not exces-
sively permissive: he rules out those medical interventions that threaten the test of athletic ex-
cellence. He argues that the use of Beta Blockers to steady the nerves and hands in an archery 
contest is a case in point. The general argumentative strategy is employed elsewhere in the 
literature (Camporesi and McNamee, 2012, Devine, 2011; and Murray, 2009).  Camporesi 
and McNamee (2012) reject the use of Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor (VEGF) to di-
minish subjective experiences of pain during endurance activities because of its threat to their 
integrity. 
Morgan’s approach is attuned to the modern day conception of elite sport. His approach 
stands in contrast to WADA’s Code, whose preamble is founded on a conception of spirit of 
sport that includes heterogeneous values such as health, and fun, which has been challenged 
for being too distant from current elite sport practice (Savulescu et al., 2004). Morgan de-
fends a treatment-enhancement distinction not dependent on biomedical or bio-statical line 
drawing. Something may well be considered an enhancement beyond sporting contexts (or 
indeed in some sports but not others), but within a system designed to test athletic excellence, 
it may be best understood as a treatment. Likewise, something might be understood as a treat-
ment outside of sport, but within sport be deemed an enhancement of some kind.  
One objection to Morgan concerns the idea that taking steroids in order to recover from hard 
training does not threaten the sporting test of athletic excellence. He writes:  
Since substances like steroids allow athletes to train harder, by among other things re-
ducing their recovery time, and since training harder is itself a response to the rise in 
levels of athletic accomplishment that enjoy wide public support, their ingesting is best 
interpreted as a cultivation of athletic excellence rather than a corruption of it.  For the 
point of an athletic test is not to gauge how quickly one recovers from training sessions, 
but rather how well one performs when it most counts, that is, on the field of play itself 
when confronted by the challenges posed by one’s own competitors.  (177) 
Morgan rejects the use of anxiety medication that directly affect the athletic ideal preserved 
in the contest, understood as performance on match or race day. This may be conceived of as 
a piece of sport reductionism; it reveals how Morgan seems to privilege both the contest as 
event, and a skill-dominated conception at that.  Sport is at least in part a process concerning 
skill acquisition, entrenchment, perfection, but also a test of bodily and psychological capaci-
ties. And these are indeed affected by by-passing recovery times, reducing fatigue experi-
enced as part of the training for competition and so on. Yet Morgan overlooks this point. He 
writes “steroids don’t impede or otherwise interfere with the execution of central athletic 
skills, but complement the execution of those skills by eliminating an (irrelevant) impediment 
to them.” (ibid)  This is too swift.  It is more than difficult to distinguish the avoidance of fa-
tigue because one has taken a medication to alleviate or diminish fatigue from one’s regimen 
since one thereby gains an advantage over one’s opponent. De Coubertin (1894) wrote of the 
ethical value of effort, but his admiration was not unbounded. Effort is exceptionally im-
portant to success in athletic achievement, but it must be understood as one component 
among many, and not a good that has unlimited value or priority. Morgan is right to hold that 
anxiety is sport-relevant, but so too is fatigue. 
The focus on events may shade the fact that athletic tests measure the ability of an athlete to 
sustain long periods of heavy training loads in order to attain excellent performances. Medi-
cal intervention to support this training appears to be directly affecting the test of, for exam-
ple marathon runners, where the ability to tolerate and remain fit during heavy training loads 
is key. This is one significant objection to Morgan’s more permissive stance, if not to his 
overall enterprise of offering a conventionalist distinction between treatment and enhance-
ment. 
A further objection concerns Morgan’s conventionalist approach that attaches normative sig-
nificance to the ethos of elite sport. One challenge to conventionalism is to locate conven-
tions that are not shared. We presume that such a case would diminish its normative force. 
For example, as seems to be the case in professional football (soccer) in the UK, the misuse 
of prescription medication is so widespread that concerns for athlete’s health have reached a 
significant level (Mundie and Jurejko, 2017). It may well be that American Football’s anti-
inflammatory misuse exceeded these concerns long ago. More problematically, it has taken a 
near crisis in concussion related injuries for the conventional understanding of the place of 
head injuries in the game to shift. For Morgan, methods such as the liberal use of anti-inflam-
matories by soccer players, at times for perceived performance enhancement, may well still 
be considered treatment if the consensus from interested parties (what has been called the 
“reference class” Boorse, 1975; 1977) believe that this is just part of the game. Yet we know 
that such use is highly problematic on medical grounds. So, one group – sports physicians – 
hold that this is a at best a placebo and at worst a self-harming convention. Athletes (or at 
least some of them) believe it is prophylactic or even therapeutically justified. How do we de-
termine the normative legitimacy or superiority of the respective conventions?    
Morgan’s conventionalist approach is more permissive than either traditional medical prac-
tice or current anti-doping policy. It draws upon the prevalent ethos in elite sport as accepting 
of a broader range of legitimate biomedical interventions. His approach takes into account the 
context in which language and such distinctions are made, rather than one that suggests that a 
disease and the therapies that seek to address it are natural categories rather than socially con-
structed ones. In contrast for Boorse (in theory at least), discerning what constitutes a therapy 
is a scientific matter, and this (though not incontestable) leaves less room for manoeuvre in 
developing anti-doping policy. As we have seen though, the contrast between value laden 
theories of health, and Boorse’s approach may be overstated. In the case of thyroxine, we 
have demonstrated the difficulty in appealing to a value free approach in distinguishing be-
tween appropriate treatment, and measures that would not qualify as treatment.   
And what of our thyroxine case? Can we defend a clear distinction between appropriate med-
ical treatment, and inappropriate perhaps even unethical use of thyroxine in a sporting con-
text? Utilising a naturalist approach here has come up against some significant obstacles. 
Boorse’s intention to stipulate a norm independent of context and value judgement has been 
subjected to critique. It seems that value judgments will likely form some role in deciding 
what constitutes a health problem or otherwise. While not advocating a naturalist account ex-
plicitly WADA’s approach (see WADA, 2016) does seem to draw upon ideas of normality, 
health and enhancement that might be supported by a Boorsian approach. One option might 
be to acknowledge the problems of the general naturalist approach, but retain its place specif-
ically within anti-doping policy on a pragmatic basis. Is this just bad (epistemic) faith? To be 
sure it is problematic, yet at least it offers a clear account for line drawing and a consistent 
basis for such.  Morgan’s conventionalism, in contrast, relies at least in part on athletes’ 
agreements. Note we do not say “consent” since this has epistemic implications that are 
highly unlikely. Achieving a level of informedness concerning long term risks and benefits to 
satisfy the term “consent” seems unjustifiably optimistic, as is the idea that their decisions 
might be wholly voluntary.  
While the rejection of a very narrow definition of health such as that proposed by Boorse 
seems reasonable in light of existing practices, the use of thyroxine to attend to the effects of 
heavy training still provokes unease by medicalising a normal sporting problem, tiredness af-
ter training. Indeed we might go further and say that the sporting test itself ought to represent 
a test not only of performance on the day, but with how well someone deals with their train-
ing load as part of the process of sport from preparation through performance and on to re-
covery. Medicating for such responses seems to jeopardise the test in a manner analogous to 
Morgan’s beta-blocker using archer, or the endurance athlete using VEGF.     
While sport legislators and those formulating anti-doping policy acknowledge the difficulty 
in distinguishing between therapy and enhancement in order to preserve the sort of test that 
sport ought to be, some reasoned differentiation is required.  It may well be that this is not 
best captured in the metaphors of a line or line-drawing, over and below which cases can 
neatly be placed.  
In the context of WADA’s PL, the use of thyroxine to compensate for such heavy training 
loads threatens to undermine the integrity of the contest. It compromises health (at high dos-
age, use can lead to tachycardia’s , potential for cardiac rhythm disturbance, weight loss, in-
testinal hurry and exacerbation of anxiety symptoms). It also seems to fail the spirit of sport 
test, understood as the preservation of the integrity of the competition itself (Cleret et al., 
2015). This approach will not be without its problems. If the move is to prohibit the sub-
stance on these grounds applications for therapeutic use exemptions for thyroxine will still be 
difficult to justify. Nevertheless, we agree with Morgan that some focus on the nature of the 
test itself is necessary in order to determine the permissibility of medical interventions.  
Thyroxine and the Spirit of Sport 
To drive our position home, however, we need to establish that not pathologically indicated 
thyroxine use is contrary to the spirit of sport. There are claims that its use is widespread, 
suggesting at least the possibility that many do not consider it contrary to the values of elite 
sport. Add to this an apparently permissive attitude toward permitted substances that might 
be thought of as helpful to performance.  
The defence of the spirit of sport criterion as an ideal rather than a reflection of current elite 
sport values has been made elsewhere (McNamee 2012; 2014). Morgan, inter alia, focuses 
on an understanding of sport, after Robert Simon (1991), as a mutual striving for athletic ex-
cellence. Means that do not threaten this pursuit of excellence are permissible, even those that 
entail medical means to support striving for excellent performance. Here we argue for a 
greater emphasis on the means via which athletes strive for sporting excellence. At elite lev-
els, at least, athletic contests supervene other activities and experiences concerning the mo-
notony of training, and overcoming niggling injury, as well as the test on competition day. 
Here we suggest that to medicalise training and performance threatens the values that such a 
test ought to promote. The ideal of athletic excellence, conforming to the spirit of sport, chal-
lenges athletes to consider what they can do to better achieve their goals, how they might 
train differently, improve technique. And, yes: to train harder too.  But not at all costs.  How 
are we to best capture the limits of what is acceptable or permissible?  It seems reasonable to 
assume that there are limits.  Would anyone really support medication that allowed one to re-
generate one’s muscles and other biological systems with an hour’s sleep in order to train 18 
hours a day not 5? Such a regime that enabled training to that extreme would seem problem-
atic on the grounds of sport-continuities between the ancient Olympic contests and our mod-
ern day heroic endeavours such as the Tour de France. 
This approach still relies on a distinction between therapy and enhancement, even one that is 
open to challenge at its borders. After all, a distinction need not be watertight in order to be 
useful.  The alternative is to reject all medical interventions for injured athletes during train-
ing and performance.  This is not an idea that has gained much traction.  Are we so worried 
about the abuse of the TUE process that we would deny athletes their rights to healthcare?3 
Neither Morgan nor we would support such a move. The question then remains, if we are to 
eschew conventionalist understandings, how do we ground that position.   
Our claim here is that part of Boorse’s account might be used, in asking whether the symp-
toms are an (ab)normal response to training, or attributable to something unique to the indi-
vidual’s physiology. Certainly Boorse’s account brings with it philosophical baggage that is 
problematic, but the account might still help us form a foundation for the conception of spirit 
of sport outlined above.  Morgan has acknowledged the limitations of a conventionalist meth-
odology. In finding public support for a more laissez faire attitude towards sporting pharma-
cology, he merely draws on examples from Hoberman regarding how great performances 
from doped athletes have still commanded public admiration.  Nevertheless, as he acknowl-
edges, this is hardly a methodologically robust basis for normative justification.  One may 
just as well refer to the loud spectator derision at the 2017 IAAF world championships where 
American sprinter Justin Gatlin won gold, having twice previously been found guilty of anti-
doping rule violations. Now of course, we do not know whether these large sections of the 
crowd were simply expressing anti American sentiment or an anti-doping one.  Large surveys 
would be needed to determine that.  And perhaps that is no bad thing that we undertake such 
research to give legitimacy or otherwise to anti-doping policy.  Yet even where there appears 
to be support for more permissive attitudes this does not give Morgan what he needs.  His 
more nuanced position is that substances like steroids are legitimately used to maintain conti-
nuity of performance not enhance it in a morally relevant sense.    
                                                 
3 For an extended discussion of cortisol and testosterone in the light of the Therapeutic Use Exemption process 
see Camporesi and McNamee (2018: 103-8) 
Following the Aristotelian dictum of expecting precision only to the degree the subject matter 
allows, we hold that for the purposes of anti-doping policy Boorse’s distinction is sufficient 
for the task at hand. Still, one might look to modify the position to generate greater ac-
ceptance.  We might happily follow Daniels’ rejection of the heavy burden of Boorse’s epis-
temology, while still embracing the notion that the distinction does justice to several widely 
shared intuitions concerning medicine and health and is a: ‘focal point for convergence in our 
public conception of what we owe each other by way of medical assistance or healthcare pro-
tection’ (Daniels 2000, 318). He goes on to argue that the distinction can support judgements 
of the medical necessity of interventions4. A further methodological point might be to query 
whether the sporting public’s acceptance of medicine to pursue the goal of being “better than 
well” is more parochial (ie American) than Morgan assumes, tied closely to privatised 
healthcare and a penchant for a pharmacological response to existential problems. 
Part of the expertise of sport preparation and competition is the ability to cultivate high de-
grees of self-bodily awareness, and with medical and scientific analytics, to tailor training, to 
ease off - or taper down - to recover fully or at least sufficiently, to return to training of com-
petition. Sometimes this will require medical treatments, sometimes not, and sometimes it 
will even require treatments that, like the doctrine of double effect, may bring some perfor-
mance gains (Pike, 2018). Nevertheless, this move already occurs within the compass of cur-
rent anti-doping policy, where efforts are made to restrict athlete’s participation on such 
grounds.  The suggestion however, is not that such judgements of normality can be made in-
dependent of value judgement, but rather that asking this question is a good start point from 
which to draw a line for the purposes of anti-doping policy. We do not, however, claim that 
the line drawing is without its problems nor that it generates ahistorical demarcations. But 
then Boorse did not claim that either, and acknowledged that reference classes are not fixed 
in that way. Rather the boundary between therapy and enhancement, is a continually revisa-
ble line from which to help navigate the ethics of medical interventions in sport. In that re-
gard, we are in sympathy with Morgan’s Wittgensteinan point that agreements in judgements 
are what ground the rules of our actions. 
What of the particular case of Thyroxine?  Perhaps more can be done to demonstrate that the 
use of thyroxine to attenuate the effects of heavy training is contrary to the spirit of sport. 
One way in which to seek to distinguish between different uses and abuses of thyroxine is to 
reflect upon the athlete’s intention. Does the athlete intend to gain an unmerited advantage 
over their opponent by using such a substance even where the enhancement is only per-
ceived?5 This would certainly be contrary to the spirit of sport. Intention, however, is not a 
central aspect of anti-doping policy. An athlete can be found to have committed an anti-dop-
ing rule violation regardless of their intentions, and indeed heavy sanctions may follow, even 
where the athlete denies their intention to cheat. This strict liability principle embodied in 
anti-doping policy makes sense at a pragmatic level, incorporating mens rea in sustaining 
anti-doping rule violations would be too burdensome in terms of time and cost (McNamee 
and Tarasti, 2010). 
                                                 
4 See Camporesi and McNamee, (2018) pp97-9 for a fuller discussion of this point within medical ethics. 
5 We are grateful for the comments of Jon Pike for indicating this line of enquiry. 
This overall line of argument offers a potential justification for placing thyroxine on the PL 
by avoiding the contentious question as to whether it enhances performance or not, and sug-
gesting that at least in some cases the use seems to reflect a potentially harmful way of medi-
cating that is contrary to the spirit of sport. Thyroxine use could be viewed as contrary to the 
spirit of sport because it involves medicating for normal responses to training. Where such 
responses are not normal that athlete would require a therapeutic use exemption to take the 
substance. The defence of this approach is arbitrary in the sense that it does not require that 
this is based upon an especially precise demarcation distinguishing between therapy and en-
hancement. Rather it draws a line between therapy and enhancement in order to preserve 
sport as a particular kind of relative test of athletic abilities and capacities.   
Implications and Conclusion 
Bill Morgan has addressed a vast range of issues in the ethics of sports.  His decades-long 
forays have been consistently critical, challenging and insightful. With respect to the treat-
ment and enhancement distinction, he advocates a position respectful of the views of those 
central to sporting practices. His more permissive stance is grounded in the conviction that 
this reflects our shifting views around what constitutes a treatment, and what constitutes 
sporting excellence. 
We are in sympathy with Morgan’s concern that athletes voices be given due space and re-
spect. While it is true that athletes have some representation on WADA’s committees, how 
their voices are heard, or whether there is any accountability for representation by athlete rep-
resentatives to the body of athletes themselves is unclear.  Although a number of organisa-
tions have recently emerged that represent athletes’ rights in a manner consistent with trade 
unions or professional membership bodies, WADA do not currently recognise any of them 
for the purposes of negotiating the social contract between athletes and anti-doping authori-
ties. Morgan’s democratic impetus has point and purchase here. 
Greater engagement with athletes and those that represent them ought to be a priority more 
generally in formulating sports policy. Yet, as we have argued there are limitations as to how 
athletes might contribute meaningfully to a debate that requires medical and scientific exper-
tise.  Here physicians must guide their athlete patients to good decisions. This of course 
leaves grey areas, and thyroxine use appears to be one such area, where a difficulty in distin-
guishing between treatment and non-treatment appears to exist. In trying to decide upon nor-
matively justifiable uses of thyroxine we have drawn upon a conception of the spirit of sport 
that differs from Morgan’s. In advocating greater attention to the means by which we seek to 
attain athletic excellence we suggest that Morgan’s more permissive stance might be revised. 
Thyroxine it is argued, used beyond medical necessity, can corrupt those aspects of sport per-
formance that contribute significantly to the nature of the test. We have also remarked on the 
potential harms to health associated with such use. Our position draws upon a conception of 
the Spirit of Sport as an ideal, rather than reflection of current elite sport practices, and makes 
pragmatic use of a Boorsian account of health, as a means with which to draw a (revisable) 
line as to appropriate and inappropriate uses of thyroxine.  
While we have argued that we can distinguish between ethically legitimate and illegitimate 
uses of thyroxine in a sporting context, the decision as to whether to add such substances to 
the PL may well encompass other factors. The misuse of prescription medications, even when 
their enhancing effects are in question certainly seems the sort of issue WADA ought to be 
concerned with. The combination of the spirit of sport and health criteria may well justify a 
ban in terms of the existing policy. It is an open question, however, whether adding to the PL 
is the most effective manner in which to address an apparent ‘mission creep’ of sports medi-
cine into the domain of enhancement or intended enhancement. 
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